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CASE COMMENT
from interference with union organizational and economic activi-
ties. In other sections such as 8(b) (4) (B) and the proviso to
8(b) (4), picketing is protected if conforming to certain conditions.
In addition, there is a strong federal policy against the capricious
exercise of state injunctive power over labor disputes.1 ' That
danger is clear if states were permitted to exercise such power
over pre-agreement activities. The result is that state remedial
power over pre-agreement activities would collide with too many
express federal considerations.
Nonetheless, a situation in which unions are permitted to ap-
ply economic pressures for illegal ends should not persist. An
aggrieved employer should be granted recourse to the Board to
prevent these abuses of union prerogatives when such activity
occurs. A Board finding of an unfair labor practice would effec-
tively mediate the competing federal and state policies." Although
the Board must make an initial interpretation of state law on the
question of violation of state right-to-work prohibitions, it is pref-
erable to the situation in which a state may compromise strong
federal policies through the implementation of state remedies.
Schermerhorn is a faithful reading of section 14(b). Perhaps
it will lead to an expansion of Board jurisdiction into pre-agree-
ment activities consonant with the federal and state policies un-
derlying the decision.
Constitutional Law: Should Privilege Against Self
Incrimination Be Available to Sole Shareholder
Regarding Corporate Books and Records?
A special agent of the Internal Revenue summoned the presi-
dent and sole shareholder of a corporation and demanded the
16. It must be noted that one of the reasons for the expression of federal
anti-injunction policy rests in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1939),
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958), which removes such injunctive power from the federal
courts. State courts are not so bound.
17. Of course, a Board determination entails some delay during which
the unions' purposes may be accomplished without injunctive relief. If this
is the case, the Board should implement the § 10(j) injunctive power vested
in it. The Board has never made extensive use of the section, but a situation
in which the unions' motivations are clear should warrant its application.
Section 10(j) reads: "The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a com-
plaint . . . charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an
unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court . . . for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. . . ."
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production of corporate books and records' in the shareholder's
possession. The president was personally under criminal income
tax investigation and refused to produce the documents on the
grounds that they might incriminate him.2 On the agent's applica-
tion for a contempt attachment, the district court decided that
the records belonged to the corporation and that the fifth amend-
ment was not applicable.5 On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed
and sustained the president's claim.' On rehearing, however, the
court changed its position and held that the stockholder of a
wholly owned corporation, personally under investigation for
criminal fraud, could not invoke the privilege against self incrim-
ination as to his corporation's records. Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1964).
The privilege against self incrimination excuses the individual,
whether a witness or the accused,6 from testifying in judicial pro-
ceedings7 to matters which might incriminate him; nor can the
claimant be compelled to produce private books and papers if
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602 gives the Secretary or his delegate
authority to examine "books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant . . . ."
If the taxpayer wishes to claim the privilege against self incrimination,
he must submit them to the judge who determines whether they will tend to
incriminate. However, the taxpayer can claim the privilege only if the records
might subject him to criminal sanctions. If he will be subject only to civil
liability such as paying a deficit or penalty, he cannot claim the privilege.
Normally, when a special agent rather than a revenue agent is making the
investigation, the taxpayer will be justified in refusing access to his books,
since the function of a special agent is to seek evidence of crimes. See Balter,
When Should the Taxpayer Refuse to Give His Books to the IRS?, 8 J.
TAXATION 130 (1958); Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in
Tax Cases, 10 TAx L. REv. 191 (1955).
2. The following records of Air Conditioning Supply Co. were demanded:
general ledger, general journal, cash receipts journal, cash disbursements
journal, sales journal, purchase journal, accounts receivable ledger, accounts
payable ledger, copies of all sales invoices and credit memoranda, paid checks
and bank statements, minute book and stock ledger. Brief for Appellee, p. 4
n.1, Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(b) provides: "Whenever any person
summoned under section ... 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons,
or to produce -books, papers, records, or other data, . . . the Secretary or his
delegate may apply to the judge of the district court . . . for an attachment
against him as for a contempt."
4. Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
5. Wild v. Brewer, No. 18860, 9th Cir., March 17, 1964.
6. Emspak v. United States, 849 U.S. 190, 197 (1955); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
7. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, pet. for rehearing denied, 356
U.S. 948 (1958); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
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they are incriminating." However, only an individual can claim
the privilege and only if he himself would be incriminated.' With
respect to documents the claimant must also have some personal
relationship to them. A personal relationship appears to require
that they be his private property or at least that he have posses-
sion of them in a personal capacity.o
The policies underlying the privilege, though a product of
history and humanitarianism, have current vitality." Neverthe-
less, throughout its history critics of the privilege have said that
its rationale is nonsensical." Bentham argued that the privilege
protects only the guilty and deprives investigators of useful evi-
dence." This position has been answered by examples in which
innocent persons are protected by the privilege.' 4 Even if Bent-
ham's criticisms have merit, society is interested in preserving
individual dignity as well as in punishing for crime. The privilege
helps delineate the individual's relationship to his government.5
The individual, who is presumed to be innocent, can refuse to aid
the state when it seeks to sanction him criminally; "the American
system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial,
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2264 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
9. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
10. By personal capacity the Court meant to distinguish holding in a
representative capacity. If the latter, the claimant is not entitled to withhold
the documents. To determine whether the possessor holds in a personal ca-
pacity the "White test" is applied. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
In a few cases an agent, in possession of documents which are his prin-
cipal's private property, has been permitted to claim the privilege for his
principal. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) (attorney-
client), for a discussion of those cases.
11. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), held that the privilege against
self incrimination was binding on the states via the fourteenth amendment.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), held that one state cannot
compel testimony that would incriminate the witness under the laws of an-
other state unless effective immunity is given.
For a good discussion of the privilege and its history see GRISwoD, THE
5TH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2250;
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MqNx. L. REV. 1 (1949).
12. 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDIcIAr. EVIDENCE 207-20 (1827); TRAIN,
CounRs, CRNrNALS AND THE CAMJORRA 19 (1912).
13. 5 BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 12, at 210, 216.
14. See GaRiswoLD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 10-22.
15. "The privilege contributes toward a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load." 8 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra
note 8, § 2251, at 317; see Fortas, The Fifth Amendment; Nemo Tenetur
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and ... the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay."",
Any attempt to prosecute for thought or opinion is stifled since
proof would be difficult. Privacy is protected to the extent that
the accused is not subject to judicial inquisition.' 7 The individual
is not forced to the choice of incrimination, contempt, or perjury.
The result is a recognition that the individual is sovereign in some
respects and that government is limited. Though it should not
be a goal of the privilege to make law enforcement difficult, im-
plementation of its purposes should take precedence over the
resulting difficulties caused in the areas of government regulation
and law enforcement.'
A corporation may not claim the privilege on its own behalf.19
This denial is based on the necessity of access to corporate records
in order to effectively regulate corporate conduct. Certainly, it
would be equally useful to require individuals to produce their
records in order to regulate their conduct. However, since cor-
porate activity may have a potentially greater effect on the public,
there is a greater need for governmental regulation 0 More im-
portantly, the privilege is designed to protect personal rights
rather than those of a legal creature 2 Similarly, a corporate
officer may not refuse to produce corporate documents when
ordered to do so even though they tend to incriminate him per-
sonally.2 This rule was established in Wilson v. United States?
Prodere Seipsum, 25 Cvav. B.A.J. 91 (1954); Kenealy, Fifth Amendment
Morals, 8 LovoLA L. REv. 93 (1956); Martin, The Privilege Against Self
Incrimination Endangered, 5 CAN. B.J. 6 (1962); The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: An International Symposium, 51 J. Camr. L., C. & P.S. 129
(1960).
16. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
17. Martin, supra note 15, at 9; Nutting, The Fifth Amendment and
Privacy, 18 U. PITT. L. REv. 533 (1956).
18. 322 U.S. at 698.
19. E.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 682 (1950); Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906). See generally 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2259a;
Annot., 120 AL.R. 1102 (1939).
20. Many people may deal with a corporation if its business activities
are extensive. Also, a corporation may have a large group of shareholders
who have money invested in it but who are not in close contact with it. Indi-
viduals dealing with a corporation and those who buy shares in it may not
be able to protect themselves sufficiently without government regulation.
21. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
22. See, e.g., Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923);
Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wheeler v. United States, 226
U.S. 478 (1913); Drier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911); United States
v. Fago, 319 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963); United
States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally Fraser, The
814 [Vol. 49:311
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Wilson was relied upon by the court in Wild and therefore
needs examining. The Wilson Court justified its denial of the priv-
ilege to a corporate officer personally under indictment' on two
grounds. First, the recognition of the official's personal privilege
would hamper regulation of the corporation by making the
records unavailable?. Second, the records belonged to the corpora-
tion and the official held them in a representative capacity only;2 6
his personal interest in the documents was insufficient to justify
extending the privilege to him. Since the corporation was not
being investigated in Wilson, the first justification seems insuffi-
cient. It would be easy to extend the privilege with respect to
corporate records when the official himself is under indictment
and deny it when the corporation is being investigated. Thus the
second ground is considerably more important. The decision
depended on the Court's resolution regarding "the nature of the
documents and the capacity in which they are held."ar
The privilege applies only to the personal property of the
claimant or those documents the claimant holds in a personal
capacity?8 If the records are not the claimant's, it is not inconsist-
ent with the desired relationship of the individual to his govern-
ment to compel the production of such records?9 The documents
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as Applied to Custodians of Organiza-
tional Records, 33 WAsH. L. REv. 435 (1958); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 394
(1964); Annot., 152 AL.R. 1908 (1944).
23. 222 U.S. 361 (1911).
24. The grand jury had returned two indictments against Wilson before
they issued a subpoena for the records. Id. at 367.
25. Id. at 384-85.
26. Id. at 377-78.
27. Id. at 380.
28. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the landmark case on
privileged documents, the Court did not limit the privilege to private docu-
ments; however, the Wilson Court concluded that Boyd clearly implied that
the papers must be personal. 221 U.S. at 380. In White the Court said "the
papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property
of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely
personal capacity." Although the concept of holding in a "personal capacity"
is not clear, the Court meant at least to exclude holding in a representative
capacity. 322 U.S. at 699.
29. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra. It may also be argued that
though the claimant owns the documents there ought to be a distinction
between documents relating to personal affairs and those of the individual's
business. The Government may have a greater interest in regulating business
and economic affairs than personal affairs. Also, in terms of limited govern-
ment, individual dignity and privacy, and the accusatorial system, the privi-
lege is more important with respect to matters which affect the private lives
of individuals. See Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cni. L. REv. 687, 715 (1951).
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sought in Wilson recorded group activity and belonged to the
incorporated group. Wilson held the documents as agent for the
group and was duty bound to produce them for members' scrutiny
upon request.30 The Court reasoned that just as a public servant
must produce public records on demand, so must a corporate
custodian produce corporate records.' In Wild, however, the
documents recorded the claimant's private business affairs; no one
but Wild had a direct interest in them. Wild held the records in
the purely personal capacity of sole owner, not as agent for a
group. Thus, the nature of the documents and the capacity in
which they were held were personal, not corporate. The corpora-
tion was his personal business, just as it was before incorporation;
there were no public or group interests involved.32 The result in
Wilson, therefore, does not control Wild, because Wild's relation-
ship to the documents and to the corporation is analogous to that
80. 221 U.S. at 884.
81. Id. at 382.
82. Other sole stockholder cases are Nilva v. United States, 852 U.S. 385
(1957); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); United States v. Guterma,
272 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881 (S.D.N.Y.
1931); In re Greenspan, 187 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Application of
Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
In Nilva, the records were subpoenaed in connection with a trial for
conspiracy to violate the Federal Slot Machine Act. Petitioner, who was vice-
president of a slot machine distributing corporation wholly owned by a co-
defendant, had been found guilty of contempt for failure to comply with
the subpoena for the records. Although the codefendant who owned the
corporation had been denied his self incrimination claim in the lower court,
petitioner in his case before the Supreme Court was not claiming the privilege
of the fifth amendment. Rather, he was maintaining that he had complied
with the subpoena in good faith and that the contempt conviction should be
reversed. The Court relied on Wilson in saying that petitioner had to produce
the records, but it never had to consider whether the sole stockholder could
claim the privilege since he was not a party to the appeal.
In Guterma, petitioner kept his personal records and the records of his
wholly owned corporation in the corporation's safe. The Court of Appeals
held that he had to produce the corporate records but not his personal records.
In Hoyt, a receiver in bankruptcy took possession of the books of peti-
tioner's corporation. They were then subpoenaed from the receiver. The court
said that petitioner could not claim the privilege as to the records because he
waived the right when he became bankrupt and because he had voluntarily
relinquished possession of the records when he attempted to claim the privilege.
In re Greenspan held that the corporate president and sole stockholder
was not privileged in relation to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's
subpoena of the records to ascertain the tax liability of a party who had sold
spark plugs to his corporation. The court relied on Wilson.
In Application of Daniels, the lone case holding the records to be privi-
leged, the court distinguished Wilson on the grounds that a foreign corpora-
tion was not subject to the regulatory powers of federal or state government.
[Vol. 49:311
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of a proprietor,33 not to a public servant in possession of public
records.
The court on rehearing accepted the Government's argument
that under Grant v. United States,"4 neither Wild nor his corpora-
tion could claim the privilege with regard to "corporate records."
But Grant, although purporting to follow Wilson, did not consider
the nature of the documents or the capacity in which they were
held.33 The term "corporate records" is a general term which
conceals the merits of whether or not Wild should have the pro-
tection of the privilege. With unincorporated associations the
Supreme Court has recognized that the test should not be "me-
chanical"; instead, the character of the organization should be
considered to determine whether the organization embodies group
interests or purely personal interests." Under this analysis, as
under the Wilson analysis, the Wild case comes within the mean-
ing and policy of the privilege. Permitting Wild to claim the
privilege in an action against the corporation, if corporate books
or records would incriminate him, would certainly impede regula-
tion of the corporation. But the need to regulate Wild's corpora-
tion is no greater than the need to regulate sole proprietorships or
33. A business may be incorporated for a number of reasons such as tax
consequences or limited liability. Permitting the one-man corporation may
stimulate business because it permits the small businessman to compete with
the large corporation. With the addition of subchapter "S", Ir. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 1371-77, proprietorships and partnerships may be induced to
incorporate since the subehapter permits a corporation which meets certain
requirements to elect to have its income taxed directly to the shareholders
rather than to the corporation. See Willis, Subckapter 8: A Lure to Incorporate
Proprietorships and Partnerships, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 505 (1959). See generally
The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 Hanv.
L. REv. 1373 (1938). In United States v. Kimmel, 274 Fed 54 (2d Cir. 1960),
the business was incorporated in response to a demand of a creditor for 30%
of the interest of the corporation in exchange for further advances.
The fact that a corporation, as contrasted with a sole proprietorship, has
limited liability and special tax advantages is not relevant in the determina-
tion of the applicability of the self incrimination privilege. To argue that one
who receives these benefits cannot be heard to claim the privilege is to beg
the question. The applicability of the privilege ought to be determined by
applying its policies to the particular facts.
34. 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
35. See Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1964) (dissenting
opinion).
36. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). The White test is:
whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular
type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or repre-
sent the purely private or personal interest of its constituents but rather
to embody their common or group interests only.
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partnerships, which are protected by the privilege. 7 There are no
investors or shareholders in Wild's corporation who need protec-
tion. A proprietorship or partnership may have dealings with the
public which are equally as extensive as those of a solely owned
corporation. In addition, since Wild holds the records in a "purely
personal capacity," his claim of the privilege is similar to an
individual's." The Government should respect the claimant's
rights regarding the documents; in order to prosecute, the Govern-
ment should seek evidence elsewhere; if the public need for the
records transcends the interest in prosecuting the individual, the
state can grant immunity. 9 Since the corporation embodies only
Wild's personal business and he holds the records in a personal
Cases in which the White test has been applied are: McPhaul v. United
States, 364 U.S. 872 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress); Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367 (1951) (dictum) (Communist Party); Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Ed., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (Communist Party);
United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1951) (a declared trust). Compare
United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807
(1963) (partnership), with In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418
(N.D. Cal. 1948) (partnership).
37. Two cases granting the privilege to partnerships are United States v.
Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954), and In re Subpoena Duces Tecum,
supra note 36.
38. Since the case of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948), which
held that a statutory requirement that records be kept renders the required
records of an individual unprivileged, it has not been clear whether this re-
quired records doctrine would apply to tax investigations. See Meltzer, supra
note 29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6001 provides:
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title . . . shall
comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary or his delegate
may from time to time prescribe. Whenever in the judgment of the
Secretary . . . it is necessary, he may require any person, by notice
served upon the person or by regulations . . . to keep such records,
as the Secretary or his delegate deems sufficient to show whether or
not such person is liable for tax under this title.
Although this is a statutory requirement to keep records, the text of the
section seems to require the records for civil liability only and not for crim-
inal liability. See Spilky, Have We Lost Our Civil Rights in Tax Matters?,
37 TAXES 603 (1959).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602, also embodies rights of the Government
to examine and subpoena records. However, except for Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), 32 TEXAs L. REV. 453 (1954), the courts
have not extended the required records doctrine into the tax field. See Redlich,
supra note 1; Note, 42 B.UL. REV. 227 (1962); Note, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 74
(1962.).
39. Immunity has to be granted by statute. For a list of federal immunity
statutes, see 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2281, at 495 n.11. See also
Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEO. WASK.
L. REV. 446 (1954).
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capacity as sole owner, the policies of the privilege should take
precedence over incidental difficulties in regulation.o
Wild's claim of self incrimination is the type which the fifth
amendment should protect. The Wilson and Grant decisions do
not compel the "mechanical" rejection of Wild's constitutional
privilege merely because of incorporation. Since Wild's claim fits
the spirit and policy of the privilege, he should not be compelled
to give up the records, whether he or his corporation is being
investigated, if they tend to incriminate him.
Administrative Law-Criminal Law-Inspections
Without a Warrant Made Under Public Health,
Safety, and Welfare Laws Held Unconstitutional
for Purpose of Criminal Prosecutions
Defendant had been convicted of violating a zoning ordinance
of the village of Laurel Hollow, New York, which made it a crime
to conduct a business in a nonbusiness zone.- Building inspectors
had entered defendant's premises, over his objections, under
authority of section 10.1 of the village Building Zone Ordinance,
which authorized the building inspector "to enter any building or
premises at any reasonable hour." Evidence was thereby obtained
that defendant was using his mansion, in a residential area, for
the business of design and fabrication of furniture, fabrics, wall
coverings, and similar materials. On appeal the New York Court
of Appeals, by a divided court, reversed and held that a search
by public officials without a warrant was unconstitutional when
done for the purpose of obtaining criminal prosecutions. People v.
Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441,251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
The leading case on administrative search is Frank v. Mary-
land,' in which the United States Supreme Court held, by a
divided court, that the power of health inspectors to search did
not depend upon a search warrant.' In Frank, a city health in-
40. A test to determine which types of corporations are such that the
custodian should be permitted to claim his personal privilege as to the docu-
ments is difficult to state with precision. Perhaps the White test, now used
for unincorporated associations, is a start. See note 36 supra.
1. Laurel Hollow, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance art. x, §§ 50, 10.2, re-
ferred to in the instant case.
2. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
3. A number of earlier state cases, not relied on in Frank, allowed health
and safety inspections of public or quasi-public places without warrants. Hub-
bell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910) (hotel); Keiper v. City of
Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337
1964] 319
